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Abstract 
 
The hypnotic phenomena have long been debated. In scientific research, disagreements 
on the conceptual and methodological approach have led to controversial results and 
interpretations which heat up the debate. Additionally, hypnotic suggestibility is often 
measured only behaviourally, subjects are studied in masses and the role of individual 
responders is largely neglected. One way to reach beyond mere behaviour to the level of 
experience without losing the individual variability is by combining posthypnotic 
suggestions, self-reports, psychophysiological measurement techniques and a case study 
approach. 
 
The present study examined the effects of suggested changes in the visual colour 
perception of simple geometric shapes in the posthypnotic and the simulation condition 
as measured by self-reports, reaction times, error rates and event-related potentials 
(ERPs). The case study approach was chosen and the focus was set on two highly 
suggestible hypnotic responders. The comparative data for simulation were also 
obtained from a set of control subjects. 
 
Results indicated differences in processing between the posthypnotic and simulation 
condition seen in the behavioural performance and to a lesser extent in the posterior N2 
and P3 peaks of the ERP waves. Evident dissimilarities were found also among highly 
suggestible hypnotic responders. These results support the occurrence of inimitable 
hypnotic modulations in some individuals and point out the need to examine hypnotic 
responders on a more individual basis. 
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Tiivistelmä 
 
Hypnoosi on jo kauan ollut hyvin kiistanalainen aihe. Erot lähestymistavoissa, 
käsitteiden määrittelyssä ja menetelmien valinnassa ovat johtaneet eriäviin tuloksiin ja 
tulkintoihin, jotka kasvattanut kuilua eri näkemysten välillä entisestään. Lisäksi 
herkkyys hypnoottisille suggestioille mitataan usein vain käyttäytymisen perusteella, 
koehenkilöitä tutkitaan joukkoina ja yksilöllisen vaihtelun osuus jää huomioimatta. Yksi 
tapa lähestyä käyttäytymisen taustalla olevaa kokemusta on käyttää posthypnoottisia 
suggestioita ja kyselyitä sekä mitata aivojen aktiivisuutta. Yksilöllinen vaihtelu taas 
voidaan ottaa huomioon käyttämällä yksilötutkimusasetelmaa. 
 
Tässä tutkimuksessa käytettiin suggestiota, joka ohjeisti näkemään tietyn kolmesta 
geometrisesta muodosta toisen värisenä kuin mitä se todellisuudessa oli. Kaksi 
suggestioille erittäin herkkää yksilöä toimivat tämän suggestion mukaan joko 
posthypnoottisesti tai jäljitellen tätä. Kokeiden aikana tarkasteltiin muutoksia 
reaktioajoissa, virheiden lukumäärissä ja aivojen tapahtumasidonnaisissa 
jännitevasteissa. Lopuksi kokeiden aikaisia kokemuksia kartoitettiin. Vertailun vuoksi 
jäljittelyn aikaisia mittauksia tehtiin myös kolmelle kontrollikoehenkilölle. 
 
Tulokset osoittivat, että tutkittujen suggestioherkkien yksilöiden havaintojen käsittely 
oli erilaista posthypnoottisessa ja jäljittelytilanteessa, mikä näkyi enemmän 
käyttäytymisessä ja vähemmän aivojen sähköisessä aktiivisuudessa. Myös 
suggestioherkkien yksilöiden välillä oli huomattavia eroja. Nämä tulokset vahvistavat 
käsitystä siitä, että hypnoosi voi vaikuttaa joihinkin yksilöihin tavalla, jota ei pystytä 
jäljittelemään, ja korostavat tarvetta tutkia enemmän hypnoosiin liittyvää yksilöllistä 
vaihtelua. 
 
 
Avainsanat: Hypnoosi, Hypnoottinen virtuoosi, Tapahtumasidonnaiset jännitevasteet, 
Visuaalinen hallusinaatio, Yksilötutkimusasetelma 
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C+  Targeted colour 
C-  Untargeted colour 
CS1  Control subject number one 
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1. Introduction 
 
Hypnosis often refers to a strange condition resembling sleep, but marked by a peculiar 
involuntary activity. The reputation of hypnosis has varied over the centuries. During 
the latest decades the controversy over the origin and nature of hypnotic phenomena has 
turned into a heated state vs. non-state debate between those who view hypnosis as a 
specific altered state of consciousness enabling the automatic occurrence of hypnotic 
phenomena, on one side, and those who see no need to explain it by alterations in the 
brain state and all the hypnotic phenomena to be imitated in the normal state with a 
sufficient amount of effort, on the other side (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003; Lynn & Green, 
2011; Lynn, Kirsch & Hallquist, 2008).  
Nowadays, understanding hypnosis is hoped to give insight on and take into use 
the full potential of the human mind. In order to achieve this, scientists try to find the 
very essence by peeling off hypnosis from its reputation, unnecessary components and 
confounding variables by using new brain imaging techniques and novel experimental 
paradigms. However, so far the field of hypnosis is torn apart by uncertainties and the 
research has yet a long way to go to form a solid ground. From the theoretical point of 
view, hypnosis as an altered state is hard to approach, since there is no commonly 
accepted definition of an altered state of consciousness (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003) and 
disagreements about whether hypnosis deserves to be called a state at all. Even the 
wealth of empirical research, conducted on the behavioural and neurophysiological 
concomitants of hypnosis, has many controversial findings (Oakley, 2008; Spiegel, 
White & Lynn, 2010). Some components of hypnotic procedure have been found to 
play a crucial role in hypnotic responding, while others have not gained any systematic 
empirical support for their importance in occurrence of hypnotic phenomena.  
Though sometimes viewed separately, the theoretical and empirical sides of 
hypnosis are strongly intertwined. Thus, the empirical lack of recurrence could be at 
least partially explained by the dissimilarities in methodology among studies of 
different theoretical camps (Oakley, 2008). The state view defenders focus their 
research on the extraordinary experiences and behaviour awoken by the hypnotic 
induction, while the non-state viewers search for explanations of the hypnotic 
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phenomena in the social agreement, overall responding to imaginative suggestions and 
being influenced by expectations. 
The main characteristic of hypnosis both parties agree on is the increase of 
sensitivity to suggestive communications. Hence, what usually unites the studies of 
hypnosis is that in most of them subjects are selected by their scores on the classical 
suggestibility scales. In these, scores are given based on the display of the suggested 
behaviour by the subject. However, there seem to be notable individual differences in 
the effect of hypnosis even among those who score highly on these scales (Howard & 
Coe, 1980; Schuyler & Coe, 1981; Szechtman, Woody, Bowers & Nahmias, 1998; 
Terhune, Cardeña & Lindgren, 2011b). This fact has set the need to find new ways to 
differentiate among hypnotic responders. Until then the case study approach is proposed 
to be a fruitful method to get closer to understanding the full depth of the phenomenon 
(Kallio & Revonsuo, 2005; McConkey, Glisky & Kihlstrom, 1989; Raz, Moreno-
Íñiguez, Martin & Zhu, 2007; Weitzenhoffer, 2000).  
One of the results of increased sensitivity to suggestions is an ability to 
hallucinate. Having been described already long ago hallucinations are still used in the 
scales measuring suggestibility. The hypnotically suggested changes in the visual 
domain are known as hypnotic visual hallucinations and are thought to be particularly 
indicative hypnotic phenomena and an essential target for research (Revonsuo, Kallio & 
Sikka, 2009). There is evidence that suggestion has the potential to produce 
hallucinations by overriding even automatic visual functions such as word recognition 
(Raz, Fan & Posner, 2005; Raz, Kirsch, Pollard & Nitkin-Kaner, 2006; Raz et al., 2007; 
Raz, Shapiro, Fan & Posner, 2002) and colour perception (Kallio & Koivisto, in press; 
Kosslyn, Thompson, Costantini-Ferrando, Alpert & Spiegel, 2000; Mazzoni, 
Rotriquenz, Carvalho, Vannucci, Roberts & Kirsch, 2009; McGeown et al., 2012). 
Nevertheless, results in this area are not consistent and the exact magnitude of this 
effect is yet to be discovered. 
The present study was designed to take part in the empirical research on 
hypnotic visual hallucinations. It examines the influence of the condition (hypnotic vs. 
normal), in which the suggestion for visual hallucination is received, on the modulation 
of colour perception as measured by reaction times and accuracy rates as well as brain 
electrical activity potentials. In order to control for individual dissimilarities, subjects 
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are treated as cases. This chapter will introduce the topic more closely, take stock of the 
key points in the state vs. non-state debate, main theoretical and practical findings in the 
field of hypnosis and lead into the research question. 
 
1.1. Defining the topic 
 
Hypnosis is defined by Division 30 of the American Psychological Association (APA) 
(Green, Barabasz, Barrett & Montgomery, 2005) the following way: 
“Hypnosis typically involves an introduction to the procedure during which the subject is told that 
suggestions for imaginative experiences will be presented. The hypnotic induction is an extended 
initial suggestion for using one’s imagination, and may contain further elaborations of the 
introduction. A hypnotic procedure is used to encourage and evaluate responses to suggestions. 
When using hypnosis, one person (the subject) is guided by another (the hypnotist) to respond to 
suggestions for changes in subjective experience, alterations in perception, sensation, emotion, 
thought or behaviour. -- If the subject responds to hypnotic suggestions, it is generally inferred that 
hypnosis has been induced. Many believe that hypnotic responses and experiences are 
characteristic of a hypnotic state. While some think that it is not necessary to use the word 
“hypnosis” as part of the hypnotic induction, others view it as essential.” 
This description of hypnosis introduces the concepts of induction and 
suggestion, which are the most important terms in the discourse over the nature of 
hypnosis. Suggestions or suggestive communications are statements, given to the 
subject, which can take the form of instructions, commands, questions or assertions in 
order to produce avolitional responses in the subject (Weitzenhoffer, 2000). Induction 
can be defined as merely a suggestion among others, a suggestion to enter hypnosis, 
usually imagined as the eye-fixation suggested sleep induction or some variations of it 
(Weitzenhoffer, 2000). Though in fact, induction has no such strict boundaries, and for 
example relaxation has been found as an unnecessary part of the induction regarding 
responsiveness to suggestions (Banyai & Hilgard, 1976; Kirsch, Mobayed, Council & 
Kenny, 1992). It has even been stated that any kind of procedure can be used as an 
induction as long as the subject recognizes that procedure as such (Kirsch, 2001). These 
broad boundaries of induction and suggestion will be followed here. 
Suggestive communications play a special role in the phenomenon of hypnosis. 
Hypnotic suggestion is meant to affect performance during hypnosis and posthypnotic 
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suggestion refers to the suggestion given during hypnosis in which the subject is 
instructed to show certain behaviour or have certain experiences after the termination of 
hypnosis. Particularly, the responding to posthypnotic suggestions is characterized by a 
lack of awareness of the reason for the behaviour and a feeling of compulsion to react in 
a certain way (Kihlstrom, 1985). As opposed to social request, posthypnotic suggestions 
are seen as operating at the level of experience, not merely behaviour (McConkey, 
2008) and have been used in several studies (Raz et al., 2005; Raz et al., 2007; Raz et 
al., 2006; Raz et al., 2002; Kallio & Koivisto, in press). At the same time, it is good to 
remember that results obtained by the posthypnotic suggestions do not tell anything 
about the hypnotic state per se. 
The soft-worded definition of hypnosis by APA concentrates on the hypnotic 
reaction and tries to overlook the definition of the hypnotic state. This is quite 
understandable, since while responding to hypnotic suggestions can be observed and 
even measured, there is so far no objective way to decipher whether a person is under 
hypnosis or not. Meanwhile, there are some uncertainties also in the definition of 
hypnotic responding. For instance, it has for a long time been studied as hypnotisability. 
However, by definition, hypnotisability is merely the increase in responsiveness due to 
hypnotic induction. Since most studies do not measure the baseline non-hypnotic 
responding, there is no way to evaluate this increase caused by hypnosis and the word 
hypnotisability is then used to refer to the total responsiveness during hypnosis (Kirsch, 
1997). Here a clear distinction will be made between hypnotic or post-hypnotic 
suggestibility, as the total responsiveness due to the involvement of induction, and 
hypnotisability, as only the increase in suggestibility caused by hypnosis. Now that the 
key concepts are familiar an overview of the origin and the current condition of the state 
vs. non-state debate can be made. 
 
1.2. Historical debate 
 
Hypnotic phenomena have fascinated inquisitive human minds for centuries. The 
historical review is usually started with Franz Mesmer’s (1734–1815) understanding of 
the nature of sudden curative incidents taking place after his suggestive procedures. He 
argued these phenomena to be caused by invisible animal magnetism, and quite soon 
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was proven to be wrong. Later on, these occurrences were renamed to hypnotism by 
James Braid (1795–1860), who revived their reputation, tried to bring them closer to 
neurological conceptualization and developed his own view according to which the 
unique effect of hypnosis is psychophysiological by nature and caused by suggestions. 
He also recognized the history of hypnotic phenomena to reach far into centuries ago 
(Braid, 1846).  
Over the years both scientific and public opinion about the nature of hypnosis 
underwent great transformations and the dispute evolved. In the 1900th century 
straightforward behavioural experiments conducted on impressionable individuals 
relying on a special state of hypnosis were confronted by the modern approach with 
more elaborated experimental paradigms and mass examination. This confrontation 
questioned all the previous results and observations and stripped hypnosis from its 
special status. Nonetheless, neither of these approaches fully satisfied all the scientific 
brethren and some have continued to search for the ‘real’ hypnosis. 
Nowadays, hypnosis still is a highly controversial and debated matter. As 
Kihlstrom (1985) points out, the field is characterized by consensus over basic 
observations, but controversy over their interpretation. Roughly, opinions are often 
divided in two based on the question of state (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003; Lynn & Green, 
2011; Lynn et al., 2008). One side reckons hypnotic phenomena to be unique and bound 
to qualitative alterations in the mental state. The other side sees no need to go into this 
undefined area and instead tries to explain them only by already well-known 
psychological concepts, such as expectations and motivation. Thus, the first view is 
often referred to as the state view and the second one as the non-state view. 
According to the state view, the hypnotic induction produces a shift − whether 
interpreted as trance, dissociation or otherwise an altered state of consciousness – which 
evokes extraordinary behaviour, abilities and experiences such as realistic 
hallucinations, naturally and regardless of whether the procedure is detected as hypnosis 
or not (Barabasz, Barabasz, Jensen, Calvin, Trevisan & Warner, 1999; Gruzelier, 1998; 
Orne, 1959; Hilgard, 1973; Spiegel & Spiegel, 2004). This perspective concentrates on 
the intrinsic neurophysiological processes following induction and being in hypnosis.  
Non-state view theorists consider hypnosis merely as responding to imaginative 
suggestions independent of hypnotic induction (Barber, 1964; Kirsch & Braffman, 
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2001). This viewpoint does not deny the possible occurrence of shifts in mental 
processes or subjective feelings of such, but does not perceive them as the cause of 
hypnotic phenomena and rejects labelling them as the altered state of consciousness 
(Kirsch, 2001; Lynn et al., 2008). Hypnosis is defined in the sociopsychological context 
it is engaged in. The focus is on processes outside the individual such as interaction 
with the observer, and mostly preceding the induction such as rapport with the 
hypnotist, the expectations and beliefs attached to hypnosis. This basic division implies 
that the state and non-state view defenders use qualitatively different approaches when 
studying hypnosis, which quite naturally leads to differing results and often prevents 
comparison. 
Some theorists present their own views on the nature of hypnosis, trying to 
accommodate both extremes. For instance, Lynn et al. (2008) introduce their stand as 
the response set theory. It stands that though both intended and unintended actions are 
affected by inner cognitive models, at the moment of execution they are all unconscious 
and automatic, and the sense of deliberation is always merely an illusion. Though this 
non-state theory is sociocognitive by nature, it has a shade of reverence towards the 
state view. 
Meanwhile, Kallio and Revonsuo (2003) propose both state and non-state views 
to be equally right, but in different circumstances, and hypnosis to consist of two parts – 
the hypnotic state and the degree of responsiveness to imaginative suggestions which 
can be enhanced by the presence of the hypnotically induced state. According to the 
researchers, although many hypnotic experiences do not require the presence of an 
altered mental state and are fully explained by non-state views, in some cases clear 
qualitative shifts caused by induction do occur and should be distinguished. 
There have also been a few optimistic attempts to bring opponents to an 
agreement by emphasizing their commonalities (Hilgard, 1973; Lynn & Green, 2011).  
Regardless of the base camp, both views recognize the importance of such factors as 
expectations, response motivation and rapport with the hypnotist for the outcome of 
hypnotic procedure (Lynn et al., 2008). In addition to that, there can be seen some sort 
of common acknowledgement that suggestions create altered experiences and the 
changes caused by suggestions resemble those produced by real-life experiences 
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(Kosslyn et al., 2000; Szechtman et al., 1998) indicating that subjects are not simply 
faking the altered perceptions.  
As regards most of the other issues, counterparties remain firm to the extent that 
the state vs. non-state debate is occasionally recognized as unfruitful (Hilgard, 1973; 
Kihlstrom, 2005) or at least unresolvable with the current lack of common definitions, 
for example of an altered state, and solid research evidence (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003; 
Lynn et al., 2008). Some want to call hypnosis an altered state, others as merely a 
feeling of an altered state, and devotees of both views manage to collect evidence in 
support of the theory they feel anchored in. As Hilgard (1973) notes, frequently the 
alternative views seem to accept the same facts under different labels and occasionally 
tend to emphasize some facts while ignoring others. Kihlstrom (1985) reminds of the 
importance of taking both views into consideration and discovering the laws of hypnotic 
behaviour and experience rather than enforcing them. In order to follow this rationale, 
both stances will be presented and their arguments and observations reviewed here with 
equal respect. 
 
1.3. States of altered consciousness 
 
The enigma of hypnosis can be approached from several directions. One way would be 
to start from the conceptual level by asking, what is an altered state of consciousness 
and how could it be defined and tested. Consciousness is seen to be comprised of two 
main components: awareness (i.e. the content of consciousness) and arousal (i.e. the 
level of consciousness), which are usually positively correlated (Boly et al., 2008). The 
decrease in these two is known as the state of reduced consciousness and is observed in 
for example sleep, anaesthesia, coma and somnambulism. Brain activity changes 
associated with states of reduced consciousness, such as sleep and somnambulism have 
been largely untangled (Poe, Walsh & Bjorness, 2010). However, it has been long 
known that the neurophysiology of hypnosis does not resemble that of sleep but rather 
wakefulness (Evans, 1977), and therefore hypnosis is usually not included in these 
states.  
When it comes to other qualitative changes in consciousness, some definitions 
and attributes of an altered though not reduced state of consciousness have been 
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proposed. Revonsuo et al. (2009) point out one more property of consciousness worth 
taking into account, which is its representativeness of the reality. The normal state is 
then defined as the processing of accurate information about the context. An altered 
state, on the contrary, is defined by internally or externally caused changes in the 
informational streams between the contents of consciousness and the context. The 
researchers propose this to lead to temporary and globally-emerging misrepresentations 
of the reality and to be combined with the alterations in the prefrontal cortex activity. 
Dietrich (2003) also states the importance of prefrontal activity in alteration of 
consciousness. The researcher distinguishes six possible altered states: meditation, 
hypnosis, daydreaming, runner’s high, drug-induced states and dreaming as a special 
part of sleep. Though these states are induced through various behaviours, they are seen 
to share a common neural mechanism − a transient decrease of activity in particular 
parts of the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex. Phenomenological uniqueness of each is 
stated to derive from the deregulation of different dorsolateral circuits and the degree of 
hypofunction. All in all, unlike in reduced mental states, in altered states the level of 
arousal can stay high, but the level of awareness is low or the contents are dramatically 
misrepresentative of the context. 
Adding hypnosis to the set of altered mental states proposed by Dietrich (2003) 
could be viable, since focusing on specific dorsolateral circuits does not contradict the 
finding that hypnosis is not due to general inhibition of the frontal lobe activity (Kallio, 
Revonsuo, Hämäläinen, Markela & Gruzelier, 2001; Kallio, Revonsuo, Lauerma, 
Hämäläinen & Lang, 1999). In addition to that, currently many similarities have been 
found between for example hypnosis and meditation (Spiegel, White & Lynn, 2010). 
Dietrich (2003) suggests these two to resemble each other in causing a redirection of 
attentional resources and, together with daydreaming, to be characterised by toning-
down of the external noise. As opposed to meditation, hypnosis has higher sense of self 
and lower cognitive flexibility and willed action. In hypnosis, suggestions do not pass 
on to the highest level of processing but are executed on the lower levels, creating the 
phenomenological experience of automatic behaviour.  
Despite this fair pondering, it has been questioned whether hypnosis should be 
recognized as a distinct mental state in general. After all, if hypnosis causes alteration of 
such a researched phenomenon as consciousness, some clear inimitable biological 
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markers independent of specific suggestions ought to emerge (Kallio & Revonsuo, 
2003; Lynn et al., 2008). So far, no discrete neurophysiological profile of the hypnotic 
state per se has been reported (Oakley, 2008; Spiegel et al., 2010). This has been 
appraised to result from methodological differences among studies (Oakley, 2008) and 
not conducting enough research on the so called neutral hypnosis, where no additional 
suggestions are used except the one of entering and deepening hypnosis (Cardeña, 
Jönsson, Terhune & Marcusson-Clavertz, 2012). The latter is a relatively new field of 
interest made possible by the development of brain imaging techniques. It is believed to 
help separating the hypnotic state from the effects of specific suggestions, even those 
for relaxation and focus of attention, often included already in the traditional induction. 
The research on neutral hypnosis could also aid finding the desired neurophysiological 
markers of hypnosis.  
There are also less optimistic opinions in the non-state camp regarding the 
search for the neural profile of hypnosis. According to them, most social behaviours 
cannot be well described in terms of brain activity (Willingham & Dunn, 2003). Even if 
the exact neural changes specific to hypnosis are found, the underlying meaning of these 
alterations is not clear, since all psychological processes have neurobiological patterns, 
and thus they are not enough to categorize hypnosis as a distinct mental state (Lynn & 
Green, 2011). Contrasting attitudes serve to further heat up the theoretical battle and the 
investigation of the nature of the altered state of hypnosis. 
 
1.4. Results from the field of hypnosis 
 
1.4.1. The role of components in hypnosis 
 
Another way to approach the mystery of hypnosis would be from the point of view of 
empirical research. At the very fundamental level, an empirical study of hypnotic 
phenomena is governed by the conjecture over the nature and localization of hypnosis. 
The chosen stance then determines where the focus of attention is directed in research 
and what components of hypnotic procedure are targeted (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003).  
When studying the phenomenon of hypnosis, a rough distinction could be made 
between being in hypnosis and the effects of suggestion. Though both of these are 
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included in the classical hypnotic process, they can also be examined independently as 
intrinsic and instrumental research, respectively (Oakley & Halligan, 2009). This 
division appears regularly in the state vs. non-state debate and is crucial for 
understanding it.  
Perhaps casting an eye on the results of the effects of different components on 
hypnosis might help illustrate the presented empirical division. Suggestion and its 
effects are a good starting point for presenting the instrumental research. Suggestion is a 
broad term and not all of them are alike. In fact, it has been recognized as a domain 
itself, with sub-domains such as hypnosis, placebo, memory alteration and sensory 
suggestions (Kirsch et al., 2011). A successful responding to a suggestion means 
following the given instructions. As opposed to other kinds of suggestions, hypnotic 
ones are instructions for a change in experience independent of any alterations in 
stimulus conditions (Kirsch et al., 2011). Both sides of the state vs. non-state debate 
agree on the key role of suggestive communications in hypnosis. However, non-state 
theories view this to occur mostly through some level of cognition, even if the 
conscious experience feels involuntary, while state-viewers insist on a genuine 
automaticity of responding to suggestions. 
When compared to other kinds of suggestions, such as placebos or leading 
questions, hypnotic suggestions seem to differ not only in the semantic nature (Kirsch & 
Braffman, 2001), but also in the caused brain activity patterns (Kirjanen, 2012). The 
suggestion for induction can, for instance, contain directions for muscular and mental 
relaxation, while suggestions following induction usually concern either motor 
productions (involuntary movements) or inhibitions (paralyses) or cognitive productions 
(positive obstructive hallucinations) or inhibitions (amnesia, analgesia, negative 
obliterating hallucinations) (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001; Barabasz et al., 1999). Even in 
the same hypnotic context different kinds of suggestions have been found to cause 
dissimilar neural activation (Barabasz et al., 1999; Jensen et al., 2001), which makes the 
exact verbal formulation of the suggestion a very important variable to control for. 
Kallio and Revonsuo (2003) propose that, for instance, true realistic hallucinations, as 
opposed to simple mental imagery, are brought about only by deceptive suggestions 
following a suggestion for induction and occur automatically and effortlessly. 
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The word hypnosis is also one part of the phenomenon and can be seen as a 
separate suggestion. Especially non-state researchers argue that there is no need to label 
the conducted procedure as hypnosis in order to create the hypnotic phenomena, and it 
is enough to present it as testing the ability to imagine, motivate subjects to perform 
well (Kirsch et al., 1992) and convince them in successful responding (Barber & 
Carverley, 1964; Barber & Carverley, 1965). Even more efficient is changing the 
expectations and attitudes towards hypnosis through direct experience rather than by 
mere verbal convincing (Wickless & Kirsch, 1989). Nonetheless, others’ evidence 
clearly shows that the label of hypnosis as such has a powerful influence on the 
subsequent responsiveness to suggestions as compared to presenting the same procedure 
as relaxation (Gandhi & Oakley, 2005). 
As regards being in hypnosis as the intrinsic phenomenon, induction as a special 
kind of suggestion is usually seen as an essential gate to that. It is a matter of current 
research whether hypnotic induction is necessary for the effects of further suggestions to 
manifest not only in subjective reports, but also in observed behavioural and brain 
activity changes. State view defenders insist that induction is essential for the effect of 
suggestion to occur in its full magnitude (Derbyshire, Whalley & Oakley, 2009; 
Kosslyn et al. 2000). Meanwhile, non-state view holders find induction to be 
unnecessary and to affect merely by increasing expectations, and proper suggestions to 
be enough for using normal psychological processes to their full extent (Kirsch, 2001, 
Mazzoni et al. 2009; Raz et al., 2006).  
Not much is yet known about induced hypnosis as a state independent of specific 
suggestions, also referred to as neutral hypnosis. The studies conducted on the matter so 
far have had similar findings, which show that plain being in hypnosis is qualitatively 
different from relaxed but alert wakefulness based not only on self-reports but also brain 
activity alterations (Cardeña et al., 2012; Fingelkurts, Al., Fingelkurts, An., Kallio & 
Revonsuo, 2007; Fingelkurts, An., Fingelkurts, Al., Kallio & Revonsuo, 2007; Terhune, 
Cardeña & Lindgren, 2011a). These results fortify the position and necessity of 
induction as a catalyst for the qualitative shift in the mental state. 
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1.4.2. The role of individual differences in hypnosis 
 
The tendency to respond to suggestions is called suggestibility. On the one hand, it is 
closely related to the impact of suggestion, but on the other hand, so far, it is also the 
only criteria to select subjects for study of being in hypnosis. Therefore, suggestibility 
forms a bridge between the two sides of the described empirical distinction. 
The most widely applied mean to operationalize hypnotic responsiveness is by 
using the standardized behavioural scales on hypnotic suggestibility. The typically used 
suggestibility scales, such as Harvard Group Scale of Hypnotic Susceptibility, form A 
(HGSHS-A; Shor & Orne, 1962), Stanford Hypnotic Susceptibility Scale, form C 
(SHSS-C; Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) and Waterloo-Stanford Group Scale of 
Hypnotic Susceptibility (WSGS; Bowers, 1998), a group adaptation of SHSS-C, include 
suggestions about motor and cognitive productions and inhibitions. The total score is 
derived from the number of suggestions the subject is indicated to respond to 
behaviourally and do not include any measure of various subjective experiences. The 
ability of suggestibility scales to measure hypnotic responsiveness and to define its 
relation to hypnotisability, hypnotic depth and non-hypnotic suggestibility has been 
criticized (Weitzenhoffer, 1980). Some view different types of suggestions to produce 
qualitatively different hypnotic phenomena, in which case the essential information 
might not be captured by the total score (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003). 
Responding to suggestions, as measured by the standardized scales, does not 
seem to be enhanced dramatically by induction (Braffman & Kirsch, 1999). In fact, 
Kirsch and Braffman (2001) review the results on the connection between hypnotic and 
non-hypnotic responsiveness and conclude that non-hypnotic imaginative suggestibility 
and subject’s expectations are enough to explain the major part of the hypnotic 
suggestibility. This means that hypnotisability at the level of population is negligible.  
Supporting the non-state approach, most hypnotic phenomena are known to be 
produced by suggestions even without any use of the term hypnosis or the procedure of 
hypnotic induction. Kirsch and Braffman (2001) insist that hypnotic responsiveness is 
an ability similar to other cognitive abilities, but restricted to imaginative suggestions. 
This outlook has gained support by the evidence that the stability of hypnotic 
responsiveness is comparable to that of the IQ and greater than that of many personality 
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traits (Piccione, Hilgard & Zimbardo, 1989). Hypnotic suggestibility can also be taught 
and moderately increased for a short time with the proactive cognitive-behavioural 
training (Bates, Miller, Cross & Brigham, 1988). 
At the same time, hypnotic behaviour is not hard to imitate behaviourally. So 
far, no undisputed ways to differentiate between hypnotic responding and simulation 
have been found. Orne (1959) found that, as compared with simulators, the real subjects 
invariably describe a shift in state from normal waking experience: inability to resist the 
suggestion, subjectively real quality of hallucinations and tolerance of logical 
inconsistencies. Hypnotic behaviour of highly susceptible subjects has also been found 
to be independent of being observed (Evans & Orne, 1971; Kirsch, Silva, Carone, 
Johnston & Simon, 1989; Perugini et al., 1998). However, when interpreting these 
results, it is worth keeping in mind that when subjects know that they will go through 
both non-hypnotic and hypnotic condition they might simply not perform their best in 
the non-hypnotic one due to expectations and the hold back effect (Zamansky, Scharf & 
Brightbill, 1964). That is why in addition to self-reports, substantiation can be gathered 
in the form of reaction times and accuracy rates during different forced choice tasks 
(Kallio & Koivisto, in press; Raz et al., 2006; Raz et al., 2007; Raz et al., 2002; Terhune 
et al., 2011b), with the help of brain activity measurement (Barabasz et al., 1999; 
Cardeña et al., 2012; Fingelkurts, Al. et al., 2007; Fingelkurts, An. et al. 2007; Jensen et 
al., 2001; Kallio et al., 1999; Kosslyn et al., 2000; McGeown, Mazzoni, Venneri & 
Kirsch, 2009; McGeown et al., 2012; Perlini, Lorimer, Campbell & Spanos, 1992; Raz, 
et al., 2005; Terhune et al., 2011a) and eye-movement detectors (Kallio, Hyönä, 
Revonsuo, Sikka & Nummenmaa, 2011). 
Usually studies exploit suggestibility scores to differentiate between those who 
get very high scores and those who do not seem to respond to suggestions at all, and 
compare the performance of these two extreme groups. Nevertheless, there are no 
systematically used limits for classifying the responders, and even susceptible subjects, 
who receive high scores on the suggestibility scales, differ in their hypnotic abilities and 
experiences as indicated by self-reports, task performance, physiological and neural 
activation. Among such detected factors of difference are the ability to hallucinate 
(Szechtman et al., 1998), dissociative tendencies (Terhune et al., 2011b) and the feeling 
of involuntariness in the posthypnotic condition (Howard & Coe, 1980; Schuyler & 
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Coe, 1981). These results force to question the practice of studying subjects as 
homogeneous groups based only on the suggestibility scores (Kallio & Revonsuo, 
2003). 
One way to avoid losing valuable information from the individual performance 
and examine the full depth of hypnotic phenomena would be concentrating on the 
extremely highly suggestible subjects, often referred to as hypnotic virtuosos, in the 
form of case studies. Though there are some opposing opinions (Wagstaff & Cole, 
2005), the case study approach is seen as useful, because it allows to pay more attention 
to individual differences amid effective hypnotic responders (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2005; 
McConkey et al., 1989; Raz et al., 2007; Weitzenhoffer, 2000). It could furthermore be 
seen as a form of the grounded theory method, particularly appropriate in new topic 
areas, when the theory can be inductively built, revised or extended through the analysis 
of obtained empirical data (Eisenhardt & Graebner, 2007).  
Having gone through the dispute over the meaningful components of and 
individual differences in hypnotic responding the focus of attention will next be directed 
to the empirically observed and measured effects of hypnosis significant for the present 
study. 
 
1.4.3. The perceptual and neural effects of hypnosis 
 
The exact effects of hypnosis on perception and behaviour as well as the underlying 
neural routes are studied vigorously. In the field of perception, the effect of hypnosis is 
often studied by hallucinations. According to Merriam-Webster medical dictionary 
hallucination is a perception of something with no external cause. Hypnotic 
hallucination could be defined as a spontaneous replacement of some content of 
consciousness with the suggested content (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003). It shares with the 
imaginary perception the property of being self-generated and with the real perception 
the experience of the stimulus being externally originated (Szechtman et al., 1998). 
In particular, visual hallucinations have lately attracted new research interest. A 
wealth of studies on the suggestive modulation of Stroop effect has been generated by 
Raz and his associates (Raz et al., 2005; Raz et al., 2006; Raz et al., 2007; Raz et al., 
2002). In these studies the posthypnotic suggestion was given to perceive letters in 
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colour words as meaningless symbols after which the classic Stroop test was conducted. 
Results were somewhat inconsistent since inhibition of the Stroop effect was found in 
highly suggestible subjects both after hypnotic induction only (Raz et al., 2002) and also 
without it (Raz et al., 2006). Nonetheless, these findings established the power of 
suggestion to overcome even such automatic processes as word recognition in proficient 
readers. 
Other studies on visual hallucinations have used pictures of graphical coloured 
rectangles separated by black lines, such as in Mondrian patterns, in colour and grey 
scale when giving the hypnotic suggestion to perceive the first ones in grey scale and 
the second ones in colour (Kosslyn et al., 2000; Mazzoni et al., 2009; McGeown et al., 
2012). Also here researchers obtained slightly different results concerning the necessity 
of induction for the suggested changes to occur. Kosslyn et al. (2000) found only 
hypnotic suggestions to change the activity in the colour areas of the left hemisphere 
and to create altered experiences. However, Mazzoni et al. (2009) and McGeown et al. 
(2012) showed that although hypnotic induction enhances the efficacy of suggestion in 
highly suggestible subjects, it is not necessary for the alteration of colour perception. 
Those researchers saw the difference between their results and that of Kosslyn et al. 
(2000) to be due to the use of slightly dissimilar suggestions in different conditions by 
the latter, questioned the validity of these opposing results, and gave their support to the 
non-state view of hypnotic responding as a goal-directed activity independent of 
induction. However, behavioural changes in the visual perception only after induction 
have been observed recently also by using simple coloured shapes and a posthypnotic 
suggestion to see some of these shapes in a different colour (Kallio & Koivisto, in 
press). The researchers specified that shorter presentation times could not have offered 
the opportunity to use goal-directed approach and the hypnotic responding was 
automatic. 
Despite the differences, neurophysiological findings of hypnotic responsiveness 
have shown certain common directions. For instance, changes in the default mode 
activation during hypnosis have been found to be a way to identify it (McGeown et al., 
2009; McGeown et al., 2012; Rainville, Hofbauer, Paus, Duncan, Bushnell & Price, 
1999; Raz et al., 2005). Default mode network is a common name for those brain areas 
that are systematically active when there can be seen no particular goal-directed activity 
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that is when the individual is awake and alert, but yet not actively engaged in an 
attention-demanding task (Raichle et al., 2001). This network involves the posterior 
cingulate, precuneus and the medial prefrontal cortex. Deactivation of this network 
implies presence of goal-directed occupation. Such deactivation was detected in highly 
suggestible subjects after hypnotic induction even before performing the task 
(McGeown et al., 2009). The researchers considered that, combined with the found 
activation in the attentional system during hypnosis (Rainville, Hofbauer, Bushnell, 
Duncan & Price, 2002), these results suggest that the induction works by helping the 
subject focus attention on suggestions and use imaginative skills to the full extent.  
Other promising studies have detected changes in the functional connectivity of 
the brain of the highly suggestible subjects during hypnosis (Cardeña et al., 2012; 
Fingelkurts, An. et al., 2007; Terhune et al., 2011a). Neural functional connectivity is 
the association between the coordination of activity of different cortical regions 
(Friston, 1994). In a recent study by Terhune et al. (2011a) self-reports and brain 
electrical activity data were collected from highly and low suggestible individuals 
during normal condition and neutral hypnosis. Lower connectivity was found in highly 
suggestible individuals between frontal and parietal regions after induction. These 
results were confirmed by Cardeña et al. (2012) when using neutral hypnosis. Once in a 
while subjects were prompted to report their experiences and advised to go deeper into 
hypnosis. Reported spontaneous hypnotic experiences were associated with lower 
global functional connectivity. Similar results were previously shown in a study of a 
hypnotic virtuoso (Fingelkurts, An. et al., 2007). Additionally, Hoeft et al. (2012) found 
elevated local functional connectivity between the dorsal anterior cingulate cortex and 
the dorsolateral prefrontal cortex at rest in highly suggestible individuals and proposed 
this to be the neural basis of suggestibility. 
The decrease in functional connectivity has been proposed to indicate the 
temporary inability of some cognitive subsystems to communicate with each other after 
hypnotic induction (Fingelkurts, An. et al., 2007) while enhanced communication 
between others might take place (Hoeft et al., 2012). The neural changes then result in 
alterations in the phenomenal unity of consciousness (Terhune et al., 2011b) and are 
consistent with the theoretical view presented by Dietrich (2003), according to which 
altered states of consciousness are accompanied by deregulation of different dorsolateral 
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prefrontal circuits. Connecting the presented results to the deactivation of the default 
mode network, Terhune et al. (2011a) proposed that the reduced neural coordination in 
highly suggestible individuals may mediate reduced activity in the default mode 
network during hypnosis. As a result, during hypnosis the disrupted phenomenal unity 
of consciousness is combined with greatly focused attention. 
Regarding other empirical results, a couple of studies on the hypnotic state of a 
hypnotic virtuoso indicated inimitable changes in brain oscillation patterns (Fingelkurts, 
Al. et al., 2007), automatic and volitional eye movements (Kallio et al., 2011) and a 
larger negativity to unattended deviant audiostimuli presented among identical 
audiostimuli (Kallio et al., 1999) after a hypnotic induction. Further findings and 
clarifications are needed and contemporary brain activity recording techniques are 
anticipated to answer many of the questions piled up over the years. 
 
1.5. Electroencephalography 
 
So far, one of the most used measurement tools in the research on hypnosis is 
electroencephalography (EEG) (Barabasz et al., 1999; Cardeña et al., 2012; Jensen et 
al., 2001; Kallio et al., 1999; Perlini et al., 1991). EEG is a non-invasive method of 
recording the temporal proceeding of the electrical synchronous post-synaptic potentials 
of groups of cortical pyramidal cells (Luck, 2005). Electrodes attached to the surface of 
the scalp capture the difference in the voltage between a pair of electrodes. 
When compared with behavioural measurements, continuous EEG recording 
merits by showing processing activity without requiring a behavioural response, though 
the functional meaning of this signal might not be as clearly interpreted as in case of 
behavioural response (Luck, 2005). The main strengths of EEG, as compared to 
hemodynamic brain imaging techniques, are the fine-grained temporal resolution of 
milliseconds, the low cost and relative mobility. However, its limitations are poor 
spatial detection and weak signal-to-noise ratio, so that muscle activity and surrounding 
electrical fields cause large artefacts which manage to cover the studied signal changes. 
Manual data cleaning, artefact correction and averaging of EEG across a large number 
of trials are only the briefest description of the procedures necessary to increase the 
quality of the recorded signals. 
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Event-related potentials (ERPs) are averaged EEG epochs that are time-locked 
to a specific event, usually the stimulus onset. When background brain activity and non-
neuronal electrical noise are averaged out from the event-locked epochs of data, what is 
left is called an ERP with its characteristic positive and negative deflections. ERPs are 
further analysed in terms of their positive and negative peaks which are named 
according to their polarity and order of occurrence or latency (e.g. the first negative 
peak as N1 or N100). Early peaks are mainly influenced by external factors, such as the 
physical properties of the stimulus, and depict sensory processing independent of the 
task the subject is committed to, while changes in the later peaks are due to higher 
cognitive processes and are more affected by internal factors (Luck, 2005).  
 
1.5.1. Visual attention in ERPs 
 
ERP technique has emerged to be a suitable way to study, among others, the temporal 
structure of neural activity of attentional processes. It is thus of interest in the research 
on hypnosis which is thought to include highly focused receptive concentration and 
diminution of peripheral awareness (Dietrich, 2003; Spiegel & Spiegel, 2004). Top-
down directed attention requires voluntary effort and can be seen as distinct changes in 
the ERP waves. Attention can be further divided into sustained and transient attention, 
and regarding visual features into spatial and non-spatial visual attention, all of which 
cause specific alterations in ERP profiles. Additionally, ERP waveforms elicited when 
attending to stimuli that combine several features provide information on the time 
course with which individual features and their conjunctions are selected and processed 
(Hillyard & Anllo-Vento, 1998). 
Sustained attending to non-spatial visual attributes, such as colour, orientation, 
shape and frequency of stimuli, has been found to affect ERP waves at longer latencies, 
as compared with attending to spatial features (Luck, 2005). Particularly N2 and P3 
peaks seem to be affected by visual attention. In tasks that require responding to some 
stimuli and not responding to others, inhibiting the response has been found to increase 
N2 and P3 peaks (Bekker, Kenemans & Verbaten, 2004; Smith, Johnstone & Barry, 
2008). The increase in N2 has also been detected when the stimuli are simply infrequent 
(Nieuwenhuis, Yeung, van den Wildenberg & Ridderinkhof, 2003), the subject must 
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unexpectedly produce a response with higher than normal force (Donkers & van Boxtel, 
2004) or receives a false cue to respond (Band, Ridderinkhof & van der Molen, 2003). 
Some proposed that N2 is connected to the non-motoric stage of inhibition and P3 is 
connected to motor inhibition (Smith et al., 2008). Others viewed increase in those to 
reflect conflict-monitoring and choosing between two responses rather than mere 
inhibition (Band et al., 2003; Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003). 
Third managed to find all these operation peaks to exist, but to be generated in different 
parts of the brain (Kropotov, Ponomarev, Hollup & Mueller, 2011). Recent reviews 
seem to support this latter view. Frontocentral N2 is proposed to be connected both to 
cognitive control, such as regulation of strategy, cancelling a prepared response, as well 
as the detection of novel stimuli and posterior N2 to orienting of visual attention 
(Folstein & Van Petten, 2008). At the same time, P3 peak is connected to stimulus 
probability and task relevance, the orienting of attention to unexpected or significant 
events in the environment and the updating of working memory (Linden, 2005). 
Moreover, contrasting to unattended stimuli, visual attending is often associated 
with a prolonged increased negativity at 150−350 ms after the stimulus onset (Anllo-
Vento, Luck & Hillyard, 1998; Eimer, 1997; Smid, Jakob & Heinze, 1999; Wijers, 
Mulder, Okita & Mulder, 1989). This attention-related negative shift is referred to as 
selection negativity and seems to have a posterior scalp distribution (Folstein & Van 
Petten, 2008). Such negative deflection represents the orienting towards the task-
relevant properties of the stimulus. Another way to view it would be as rather a 
cognitive process initiated after selection is finished allowing selective analysis of the 
visual percept, such as perceptual analysis in the short-term memory or feature 
integration (Smid et al., 1999). 
In the research on hypnosis, N2 and P3 wave amplitudes of attenuated stimuli 
have been found to diminish with the increase in efficacy of positive obstructive 
hallucinations in highly suggestible subjects (Barabasz et al., 1999; Jensen et al., 2001; 
Perlini et al., 1992; Spiegel et al., 1985). This might indicate that positive hallucinations 
make the subject focus away from the presented stimulus, which leads to a decrease in 
the perception of that stimulus and reduced electrical responses (Jensen et al., 2001). No 
ERP studies on posthypnotic suggestion are known to be reported of. 
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The introduced outlines from the fields of hypnosis and EEG form the 
foundation of the research presented here. They also serve to guide the choice of 
objectives and methodology and lead into the question of research.  
 
1.6. Aims of the present study 
 
In the present study, the effect of posthypnotic suggestion on the perception of visual 
stimuli of different colour and shape is examined. The used suggestion for visual 
hallucination instructs seeing stimuli of a particular shape in the opposite colour after 
which the task is to respond to stimuli of a particular colour. The aim is to find out 
whether this suggestion used posthypnotically would produce the suggested responses 
as detected by both the behavioural performance, measured in reaction times and 
accuracy rates, and electrical brain activity. Another aim is to see whether the same 
effect could be obtained when the instruction is given outside hypnosis in the simulation 
condition. 
The case study approach is taken and the focus is set on two highly suggestible 
individuals. This is done in order to detect the individual variability which can be found 
even among highly suggestible subjects. Three age- and gender-matched control 
subjects are asked to simulate the suggested perception and behaviour and use their 
imagination without inferring that they should try to mimic the exact hypnotic state. 
Additionally, at the end of the experiment case subjects who had gone through hypnosis 
were asked to report their subjective experiences during the posthypnotic condition. 
If hypnotic induction leads to a profound shift in the brain state which allows 
receiving the suggestion in a more efficient way, it would be expected that the effect of 
the posthypnotic suggestion on behavioural performance and ERPs would not resemble 
that of either control subjects or the virtuoso herself when asked to merely use her 
imagination. Changes that are not specific to the effect of posthypnotic suggestion 
should be found in both conditions and among several subjects, whereas changes 
specific to the effect of posthypnotic suggestion would be expected to occur only in the 
posthypnotic condition. 
The research field is full of controversial results thus making the setting of well-
grounded hypotheses which would not be biased a challenging procedure. In order to 
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avoid taking a side in the state vs. non-state debate, the study was conducted to address 
the following questions: Can the posthypnotic suggestion for visual hallucination 
produce the suggested behaviour and affect electrical brain activity? Is the highly 
experienced hypnotic virtuoso capable of performing equally good without the 
posthypnotic suggestion merely by using imagination or is induction necessary for the 
suggested behaviour to appear? Are these effects restricted to highly suggestible 
subjects, and are there differences among them?  
 
 
2. Methods 
 
Methodological issues form an essential part of the state vs. non-state debate and are 
key concern for the research on hypnosis. This chapter will show, how the 
methodological questions were answered in this study. It will introduce the used 
variables, measures, the actual procedure, as well as the means and parameters of pre-
processing and analysing of the data 
 
2.1. Subjects 
 
Five paid volunteers participated in this experiment. The main focus of interest was set 
on one extremely highly suggestible subject TS-H (scored the maximum of 12 points on 
both SHSS-C (Weitzenhoffer & Hilgard, 1962) and HGSHS-A (Shor & Orne, 1962)). 
This hypnotic virtuoso has a long history of successful hypnotic responding in 
experimental studies (Fingelkurts, Al. et al., 2007; Fingelkurts, An. et al., 2007; Kallio 
& Koivisto, in press; Kallio et al., 2011; Kallio et al., 1999), a psychometrically normal 
profile and no history of neurological or psychiatric illnesses (see details in Kallio et al., 
2011). Additionally, there was one not yet as well examined, but also highly suggestible 
subject RM (scored 9 points on SHSS-C and 12 points on HGSHS-A) and three control 
subjects (CS1, CS2 and CS3) whose suggestibility was not assessed. Subjects TS-H and 
RM also served as their own controls performing the task both posthypnotically and by 
using plain mental imagery. The posthypnotic suggestions were chosen because the 
main case subject TS-H is known from the previous research (Kallio et al., 2011) to be 
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motorically stagnant while being in hypnosis, which would make the behavioural 
measurements impossible. 
All subjects were women, whose age ranged between 39 and 49 years (mean 
44.2 years, SD 4.0 years). All of them were right-handed and had normal or corrected-
to-normal vision. Informed consent was obtained according to institutional procedures 
prior to participation in the experiment. The experiment was conducted according to the 
ethical standards of the American Psychological Association (APA) and approved by 
the Ethics Committee of the University of Turku, Finland (statement 18/2011). 
 
2.2. Stimuli and apparatus 
 
Visual stimuli consisted of two-dimensional images of three different shapes − triangle, 
square and circle − in one out of two different equiluminant (12.9 cd/m2) colours − red 
or blue. Monochromatic stimuli were shown one at a time at the centre of a black (0.2 
cd/m
2
) screen and were 6.5 cm wide and 6.5 cm high (visual angle of 2.5° × 2.5°). 
Subjects were seated in a dimly lit sound-attenuated room in front of a high resolution 
19’’ CRT computer monitor (1024 × 768 pixel, refresh rate of 85 Hz) which was 
positioned at eye level 150 cm in front of the subject. Stimuli were presented with E-
Prime 2.0 software. 
The six different stimuli (3 shapes × 2 colours) were presented in random order 
and with equal probability across trials so that each stimulus was presented 36 times in a 
block. Altogether each block consisted of 216 stimuli. Stimuli were presented for 24 ms 
and followed by 800−1200 ms of blank black screen so that the speed of presentation 
was on average 60 stimuli per minute and block duration did not exceed four minutes. 
Each session consisted of twelve blocks and did not last for more than an hour and a 
half excluding the electrode attachment period in EEG sessions which did not last for 
more than half an hour. 
 
2.3. Procedure 
 
The study of each subject consisted of three sessions conducted on different days: first 
one behavioural and afterwards two EEG sessions. Behavioural and EEG sessions were 
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216 stimuli, 60 stimuli/minute
“Your task is to
attend to red 
stimuli. However,
imagine that you 
have received 
a suggestion 
according to which …
you will see all 
triangles as red.”
time of 
presentation (ms)                   24       800     24      1000  24 900     24                24     1200   24
type of stimulus                   C+F- C-F+            C-F- C+F+         C+F- C+F+ 
attention                                  +                    +                  - +                  +     +
separated to prevent the movement artefacts from disrupting the EEG data. Preceding 
the experiment, all subjects were informed that the purpose of the study is to examine 
hypnosis, but control subjects were also told that they will not be hypnotized. 
The experiment was started with overall instructions which in EEG sessions 
were followed by affixing the electrode cap and establishing the signal quality. In the 
beginning of each block, the subject was told that either red or blue was the targeted 
colour. After that the suggestion was given followed by the task to press the key on a 
pad held in one’s lap with the dominant hand whenever the stimulus of the targeted 
colour was shown. Both colours were used as targets an equal amount of times. The 
tasks on behavioural and EEG sessions were otherwise the same, except that during 
EEG recordings subjects were asked to reply only to each tenth targeted stimulus while 
counting all the targeted stimuli in their mind without moving their lips or tongue. Also 
this was done to prevent the movement artefacts from disrupting the EEG data. Speed 
and accuracy were emphasized equally during the behavioural sessions. To reduce 
muscle artefacts in the EEG signal, subjects were instructed to avoid any kind of 
unnecessary movements during EEG sessions. 
 
li,  sti uli/minute 
 
“Your task is to 
respond to red  
stimuli. However, 
imagine that you  
have received  
a suggestion 
duri  hypnosis  
according to which 
you will s e all  
triangles as red.” 
 
duration of  
presentation (ms)              24      800     24    1000    24     900    24                24     1200   24 
 
type of stimulus     C F- C-F+           C F-           C+F+          C+F-          C+F+  
 
attention requirement        +                   +                   -                 +                 +                  + 
 
Fig 1. An example of the procedure in a simulation block with the task to respond to all red stimuli. The 
time of presentation of each type of stimulus and the blank screen, the type of the stimulus and the 
requirement of attention according to the given suggestion are shown below. In the behavioural sessions 
subjects were requested to respond to every targeted stimulus, while during the EEG sessions they were 
told to respond only to every tenth targeted stimulus. Instructions were given in Finnish and the text 
shown here is the approximate translation. 
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Three types of blocks were used: normal, posthypnotic and simulation blocks. 
Highly suggestible subjects went through posthypnotic and simulation blocks, while 
control subjects went through normal and simulation blocks. In the normal blocks, 
subjects were requested to react only to stimuli of the targeted colour. In the 
posthypnotic blocks hypnosis was induced with one word by an experienced hypnotist 
S. Kallio (see the video in Kallio et al., 2011) and subjects were given a deceptive 
suggestion according to which they would see, for example, all triangles as red (all 
shape × colour combinations were used in turns). After that they were awoken not 
remembering the given suggestion and the task of responding, in this case to red stimuli, 
was given. Suggestion was cancelled after each block. 
In the simulation blocks, subjects were told to imagine as if they had received a 
suggestion according to which they see, for instance, all triangles as red. Therefore, in 
this example, in the posthypnotic and simulation blocks during the task of responding to 
red stimuli they had to monitor and respond to all red shapes and blue triangles 
imagined to be red (Fig. 1) All shape × colour combinations were used as targeted 
stimuli in separate blocks.   
Functionally stimuli were divided in the posthypnotic and simulation blocks in 
four types: stimuli combining both the targeted colour and suggestion-relevant shape 
(C+F+, where C stands for colour and F for shape), other stimuli of the same colour, but 
suggestion-irrelevant in shape (C+F-), stimuli of the opposite colour and suggestion-
relevant shape (C-F+) which were targeted by the suggestion in the posthypnotic and 
simulation blocks, and non-target stimuli of untargeted colour and suggestion-irrelevant 
shape (C-F-) which were to be ignored. In the normal condition of control subjects 
responses were grouped based solely on the colour of stimulus − targeted (C+) or 
untargeted (C-). Later on this division was used when analysing the results. 
Each session consisted of two types of blocks standing for two different 
conditions. Highly susceptible subjects underwent posthypnotic and simulation blocks, 
so that the blocks targeting the same shape followed each other, but the order inside 
these couples was changed based on the condition (e.g. PHC(=posthypnotic)-
T(=triangle), SIM(=simulation)-T; SIM-S(=square), PHC-S; etc.). Sessions of the 
control subjects consisted of normal and simulation blocks which were alternated in the 
same way. The order of blocks was counterbalanced across subjects so that every 
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second subject went through the blocks in a reversed order. The highly suggestible 
subjects had their blocks in a reversed order also during the second EEG session. This 
shuffling was used to avoid any kind of influence of the order of tasks on performance. 
Each session was divided in two halves based on the targeted colour – first red 
and then blue or the other way around − and a break in between. A short practice period 
preceded each half of the session in order for the subject to familiarize herself with the 
specific task requirements. After all the sessions both highly suggestible case subjects 
were inquired about their subjective experiences during the posthypnotic condition. 
 
2.4. Measurements 
 
Data from the behavioural sessions – response times and accuracy rates − were gathered 
with E-Prime 2.0 software. Continuous EEG was DC-recorded with the NeuroScan 4.3 
acquisition system using a band pass of 0.05−100 Hz with a 50 Hz notch filter and a 
sampling rate of 1000 Hz. Signals were recorded from 19 Ag–AgCl electrodes mounted 
in an elastic cap according to the extended International 10–20 System of electrode 
placement at Fp1, Fp2, F7, F3, Fz, F4, F8, T7, C3, Cz, C4, T8, P7, P3, Pz, P4, P8, O1 
and O2. The nose tip was used as an on-line reference. Two EOG electrodes, one below 
the right eye and one in the right eye corner, were used for eye movement detection. All 
electrode impedances were kept below 5 kΩ.  
 
2.5. Data analysis 
 
Behavioural results were averaged with E-Prime 2.0 software according to the type of 
stimulus. Response time medians and Error rates were grouped in the posthypnotic and 
simulation blocks based on the previously presented division. Responses which did not 
follow the block-specific suggestion, such as not responding to C+F+, C+F- or C-F+ 
stimuli, and responding to C-F- stimuli, were counted as erroneous. In the normal 
blocks errors were detected when the key was not pressed to C+ stimuli or when it was 
pressed to C- stimuli. Response times were obtained only on the stimuli that were 
responded accurately to. Response time medians were used instead of means because 
they are less affected by the possible outliers. In order to compare the behavioural data 
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of control subjects between the simulation and normal condition new variables were 
formed by summing up the values across all stimuli and forming averaged individual 
response times and error rates in each condition. 
Response times and error rates were further analysed with SPSS/PASW 
Statistics 18. Statistical analyses were carried out using repeated measures analysis of 
variance (ANOVA) in a similar way to Kallio and Koivisto (in press). In order to do 
this, analysis were done one subject at a time using separate blocks as individual cases 
placed on rows so that every analysis of each condition was conducted on the data from 
6 (3 shapes × 2 colours) blocks. When analysing error rates, colour (colour: targeted, 
untargeted) and shape of the stimulus (shape: suggestion-relevant, suggestion-
irrelevant) and, when dealing with response time medians, the stimulus as such 
(stimulus: C+F+, C+F-, C-F+), were used as within-subject factors. The displayed 
within-subjects effects were Greenhouse-Geisser corrected. In case of the data of highly 
suggestible subjects, condition (condition: posthypnotic, simulation) was used as an 
additional factor. 
The continuous EEG was segmented into ERP waves from 100 ms prior to 400 
ms after the onset of the visual display using Brain Vision Analyzer 2.0. Data from the 
first two channels, FC1 and FC2, were disabled because of its high level of noise. A 
band pass of 0.1−20 Hz and a notch filter of 50 Hz were used. Baseline correction was 
made on the time interval from 100 ms until the onset of the stimulus. Trials with 
eyeblinks (VEOG exceeding ±70 μV) and trials with response given in the time interval 
of 200 ms prior and 800 ms after the onset of the visual display were eliminated from 
further analyses. The lowest allowed activity in successive 100 ms intervals was set to 
0.5 μV. On the basis of the literature and visual inspection of the data, peaks were 
manually found in the averaged stimulus by block waveforms of each subject. The 
information on peak latencies and their amplitudes was then exported to SPSS/PASW 
Statistics 18 for further statistical analysis. 
Based on the visual inspection the only noticeable differences of ERP wave peak 
amplitudes of different stimuli were located in the electrode channels attached to the 
posterior parietal (P3 and P4), occipital (O1 and O2) and posterior temporal (T5 and T6) 
cortical areas, so the statistical analyses were carried out only on the data from these 
electrodes. The peak amplitudes and latencies of the averaged ERP waveforms were 
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compared. Since the sustained visual attention to non-spatial features might be expected 
to have a greater effect on the later electrical activity, especially the later ERP peaks 
formed a matter of interest in this study. All peaks were analysed, but statistically 
significant differences were found only in the amplitudes of the second negative peak 
(N2 peak; time window 200−290 ms) and the third positive peak (P3 peak; time 
window 260−360 ms).  
Statistical analyses of the case study EEG data were also carried out by repeated 
measures ANOVA, using the same method as in a previous case study by Kallio et al. 
(1999) when treating blocks as distinct subjects. The block data were placed on rows 
and 12 (3 shapes × 2 colours × 2 sessions) blocks were used to represent each condition. 
First, peak amplitudes were examined. Thereafter, also the differences in peak latencies 
were inspected. Within-subject factors were cortical area (area: P, O, T) and hemisphere 
of the electrode (hemisphere: left, right), colour (colour: targeted, untargeted) and shape 
of the stimulus (shape: suggestion-relevant, suggestion-irrelevant). It is worth noticing 
that the effect of shape here is connected to suggestion and not mere physical properties 
of the stimulus or attending preferences, since three kinds of shapes were used with only 
one being targeted each time by the suggestion. Additionally, C-F+ stimuli peaks were 
compared between the conditions. Analysis of the data of control subjects included only 
these four factors, but in case of highly suggestible subjects condition (condition: 
posthypnotic, simulation) was used as one more factor. The results were Greenhouse-
Geisser corrected. 
 
 
3. Results 
 
Behavioural and EEG measurements were obtained on separate sessions, not connected 
when analysing and also here they will be presented separately. This chapter will 
introduce the results of statistical analysis and go through the significant findings. The 
results concerning particular electrode sites are not presented since the data were quite 
small, the statistical results were not systematic and the localization of the changes in 
activity was not the aim of this study. Case subjects’ self-reports from the posthypnotic 
condition are presented at the end. 
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3.1. Behavioural results 
 
3.1.1. Error rates 
 
First, the effect of posthypnotic suggestion on the accuracy of TS-H was examined in a 
colour × shape × condition ANOVA. All main effects and interactions were found to be 
significant. The highest significant interaction was that of colour × shape × condition 
(F(1,10)=70.28, p<.001). Further analyses of this revealed that the colour × shape 
interaction was significant only in the simulation condition (F(1,5)=162.52, p<.001), 
with most erroneous reactions caused by C-F+ stimuli targeted by the suggestion. When 
compared between conditions, TS-H had higher error rates in the simulation condition 
(F(1,10)=247.30, p<.001) particularly to C-F+ stimuli (PHC: 3.8%, SIM: 55.8%, 
p<.001; Fig. 2a). Therefore, for her especially the responding to the target stimuli of 
suggestion was considerably less accurate in the simulation condition.  
RM’s error rates were also affected by all the factors and their interaction 
(colour × shape × condition: F(1,10)=75.59, p<.001). Analysis of the latter showed that 
the colour × shape interaction was significant only in the posthypnotic condition 
(F(1,5)=85.46, p<.001). Alike TS-H, RM had the highest error rates in response to the 
C-F+ stimuli, responding to which was meant to show the efficiency of given 
suggestion, but she, unlike TS-H, was more precise with her responses in the simulation 
as compared to the posthypnotic condition (F(1,10)=88.24, p<.001; PHC: 68.7%, SIM: 
4.8%, p<.001; Fig. 2b).  
 
a) TS-H                             b) RM                                   
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Error rates  
(% of all the responses 
to those stimuli) for 
each type of  
stimulus as a  
         function of condition  
         (posthypnotic; PHC, and  
         simulation; SIM) for           
(a) TS-H and (b) RM.  
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Figure 3. Error rates  
(% of all the responses to those 
stimuli) for each type of  
stimulus as a function of control  
subject (CS1, CS2 and CS3) in (a)  
the simulation condition and  
(b) the normal condition. 
  
 
Individual analyses of control subjects’ data from the simulation condition did 
not show any significant effects (Fig. 3). When compared with normal condition only 
the error rates of CS1 were increased when shape was introduced as an additional 
attended feature in the simulation condition (F(1,10)=23.56, p<.005). This means that 
attending to conjunction of visual features did not decrease accuracy systematically. 
 
3.1.2. Response times 
 
Response times were analysed with a stimulus × condition design of ANOVA. Only 
stimulus had an effect on the reaction times of TS-H (F(1,13)=24.72, p<.001). She 
responded faster to the C+F+ stimuli and slower to the C-F+ stimuli targeted by the 
suggestion (ps<.01; Fig. 4a).  
 
      a) TS-H                   b) RM 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4. Response 
time medians (ms from 
the time of stimulus 
onset) for each type of 
stimulus as a function of 
condition (posthypnotic; 
PHC, and simulation; 
SIM) for (a) TS-H and 
(b) RM.  
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For RM, also the stimulus × condition interaction was significant (F(1,12)=7.72, 
p<.05). During the simulation task, her response rates to C-F+ stimuli were faster as 
compared to the posthypnotic condition (SIM: 394 ms, PHC: 506 ms; p<.05; Fig. 4b). 
These results indicate that implementing the suggestion, classifying the stimuli targeted 
by the suggestion and responding correctly to them caused a significant delay in 
responding of both case subjects. However, between the conditions, the performance of 
TS-H was more even and did not depend on whether she had received the suggestion for 
simulation or the posthypnotic suggestion, while RM had to decide for a longer time 
when responding to the stimuli targeted by the suggestion in the posthypnotic condition. 
As in case of error rates, for RM conscious simulating was noticeably more efficient 
than following the posthypnotic suggestion. 
Analysing the individual data of the control subjects and comparing them with 
the normal condition revealed that reaction times were generally increased in the 
simulation condition for all control subjects (CS1: F(1,10)=25.41, p<.005; CS2: 
F(1,10)=36.42, p<.001; CS3: F(1,10)=6.06, p<.05; Fig. 5). This means that adding 
attention to shape of the stimulus prolonged the mean time of responding for all 
controls. Overall, the behavioural results imply dissimilarities in processing of stimuli 
between posthypnotic and simulation conditions and also differences even among 
highly suggestible subjects.  
 
        a) simulation condition               b) normal condition 
 
 
 
Figure 5. Response time medians 
(ms from the time of stimulus 
onset) for each type of stimulus as 
a function of control subject (CS1, 
CS2 and CS3) in (a) the simulation 
condition and (b) the normal 
condition. 
  
 
 
 
 
 
  
31 
 
3.2. ERP results 
 
3.2.1. N2 peak 
 
The data of TS-H were analysed first with a colour × shape × area × hemisphere × 
condition ANOVA. N2 peak amplitudes were significantly affected by the colour × 
condition interaction (F(1,22)=7.30, p<.05) so that colour had an opposite effect on N2 
waves in the two conditions (Fig. 6 and Fig. 8a). In the posthypnotic condition more 
negative amplitudes were associated with C- stimuli (F(1,11)=3.36, p<.10), while in the 
simulation task C+ stimuli caused more negative amplitudes (F(1,11)=4.05, p<.07), 
although both effects were only marginally significant. The effect of shape was also 
significant (F(1,22)=5.78, p<.05), and N2 amplitudes were increased to F+ stimuli. This 
means that, irrespective of the condition, shape was a significant feature, which caused 
an effect in the visual processing of TS-H.  
The results of RM from the similar analysis showed also a condition × colour 
interaction. However, at a closer look the effect of colour was only relatively more 
significant in the simulation (F(1,11)=92.99, p<.001) as compared to the posthypnotic 
condition (F(1,11)=10.73, p<.01). Higher negative amplitudes in both were due to C- 
stimuli (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8b), the same way as in the data of TS-H from the posthypnotic 
condition. All in all, condition did not seem to have a crucial effect on processing of 
RM. The effect of shape was significant as well (F(1,22)=3.96, p<.06), with more 
negative amplitudes to F+ stimuli. The colour × shape interaction was also found to be 
significant (F(2,35)=3.64, p<.05). The C-F+ stimuli targeted by the suggestion caused 
more negativity than C-F- stimuli. Therefore, stimuli of the same colour with the shape 
of different suggestion-relevancy were processed dissimilarly. Regarding latencies, C- 
stimuli had slightly later peak times (F(1,22)=55.34, p<.001). 
The data of control subjects were analysed individually and separately for the 
normal and simulation condition. The effect of attending only to a specific colour, 
derived from the normal condition, was seen as more negative amplitudes in response to 
C+ stimuli (CS1: F(2,17)=7.02, p<.05; CS2: F(1,15)=6.30, p<.05; CS3: F(2,22)=7.42, 
p<.005; Fig. 9) as it did in the data of TS-H from the simulation condition.  
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Averaged ERPs of TS-H from six electrodes 
 
a) posthypnotic condition 
 
 
 
b) simulation condition 
 
 
 
 
Figure 6. Grand average ERP waveforms of TS-H from the posterior parietal (P3 and P4) and occipito-
temporal (O1, O2, T5 and T6) electrode sites for each type of stimulus in (a) the posthypnotic condition 
and (b) the simulation condition. 
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Averaged ERPs of RM from six electrodes 
 
a) posthypnotic condition 
 
 
 
 
b) simulation condition 
 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Averaged ERP waveforms of RM from the posterior parietal (P3 and P4) and occipito-temporal 
(O1, O2, T5 and T6) electrode sites for each type of stimulus in (a) the posthypnotic condition and (b) the 
simulation condition.  
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Averaged ERPs from T5 for each type of stimuli  
 
a) TS-H 
 
 
b) RM 
 
 
 
Figure 8. Averaged ERP waveforms from the posterior temporal (T5) electrode site for each type of 
stimulus in the posthypnotic condition (PHC) and the simulation condition (SIM) of (a) TS-H and (b) 
RM. No significant differences between the conditions were found when comparing case subject’s N2 
and P3 peaks of C-F+ stimuli. 
 
 
When attending to shape was added in the simulation condition of control 
subjects, the effect of colour remained significant only for CS2, though it was reversed 
with more negative amplitudes to C- stimuli (F(1,11)=7.18, p<.05; Fig. 10). Concerning 
the effect of shape in the simulation condition, control subjects were quite uniform in 
their results (CS1: F(1,11)=11.48, p<.01; CS2: F(1,11)=14.50, p<.005; CS3: 
F(1,11)=3.50, p<.09) with more negative amplitudes to F+ stimuli, in line with the 
results of both RM and TS-H. The results of controls indicate that adding attention to 
shape in the colour selection task affected and redirected the resources allocated to 
performing the task, at least of those processes that are seen in the N2 time interval.  
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Averaged ERPs from six electrodes in the normal condition 
 
a) CS1 
 
 
 
b) CS2 
 
 
 
c) CS3 
 
 
 
Figure 9. Averaged ERP waveforms from the posterior parietal (P3 and P4) and occipito-temporal (O1, 
O2, T5 and T6) electrode sites for each type of stimulus in the normal condition of control subjects (a) 
CS1, (b) CS2 and (c) CS3. 
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Averaged ERPs from six electrodes in the simulation condition 
 
a) CS1 
 
 
 
b) CS2 
 
 
 
c) CS3 
 
 
Figure 10. Averaged ERP waveforms from the posterior parietal (P3 and P4) and occipito-temporal (O1, 
O2, T5 and T6) electrode sites for each type of stimulus in the simulation condition of control subjects (a) 
CS1, (b) CS2 and (c) CS3. 
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In the normal condition C- stimuli  produced later N2 peak latencies among all 
control subjects (CS1: F(1,11)=25.00, p<.001; CS2: F(1,11)=71.86, p< 001; CS3: 
F(1,11)=11.67, p<.01). In case of CS2 this was so also during the simulation condition 
(F(1,11)=5.16, p<.05).  
 
3.2.2. P3 peak 
 
P3 peak analysis was also started with the data of case subjects and a colour × shape × 
area × hemisphere × condition ANOVA. For TS-H the interaction of colour × condition 
was significant (F(1,22)=12.86, p<.005), but at a closer look the colour had merely a 
relatively stronger effect in the posthypnotic condition (F(1,11)=67.06, p<.001) as 
compared to simulation (F(1,11)=22.91, p<.002). In both conditions less positive values 
were combined with C- stimuli, but the difference between P3 amplitudes in response to 
C- and C+ stimuli was slightly greater in the posthypnotic condition (Fig. 8a). The 
interaction of colour × shape was also significant (F(1,22)=10.10, p<.005). The C-F+ 
stimuli targeted by the suggestion caused less positivity than C-F- stimuli (Fig. 6). This 
implied differences in the information processing of stimuli with similar colour but 
dissimilar suggestion-relevancy of shape. A significant difference in latencies was 
found only in the simulation condition (F(2,18)=11.08, p<.005), where those of C- 
stimuli were clearly delayed as compared to C+ stimuli. 
RM’s P3 amplitudes were not affected by condition (Fig. 7 and Fig. 8b). Once 
again, these results showed that for RM the condition did not cause a profound 
alteration that would be seen in ERPs, but seemed to have merely a tuning effect. 
Latencies were found to be affected by colour (F(1,22)=24.37, p<.001) with later peak 
times to C- stimuli.  
Analysis of the data of control subjects was done separately for the normal and 
the simulation condition. The effect of attention directed to colour alone was significant 
in the data of all control subjects (CS1: F(2,18)=26.64, p<.001; CS2: F(2,19)=13.15, 
p<.001; CS3: F(2,17)=7.07, p<.05; Fig. 9). However, for CS1 less positive values were 
attached to C+ stimuli, while for CS2 and CS3 less positivity was evoked by C- stimuli. 
The results from the simulation task indicated also the main effect of colour with less 
positive peaks to C- stimuli (CS1: F(1,11)=5.05, p<.05; CS2: F(1,11)=29.84, p<.001; 
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CS3: F(1,11)=13.96, p<.005; Fig. 10). Therefore, attending to the combination of colour 
and shape did not produce a clear change on the ERP waves of control subjects in the 
P3 time range.  
The differences in the N2 and P3 peak amplitudes of C-F+ stimuli targeted by 
the suggestion between the posthypnotic and simulation condition of case subjects were 
compared in a pairwise analysis. No significant differences were found (Fig. 8) 
indicating that the processing of these stimuli was similar across the conditions. 
 
3.3. Self-reports 
 
TS-H and RM’s reports of their subjective experiences from the posthypnotic 
condition were quite opposite. TS-H told that she did not notice any difference between 
the stimuli in perception, and experienced the suggested hallucinations as real without 
making an effort. RM admitted that during the posthypnotic condition she felt awkward 
because of the contradiction when “eyes say one thing and the brain says another thing” 
and did not see the stimuli targeted by the suggestion in the suggested colour. 
 
 
4. Discussion 
 
In the present study, the combination of behavioural and EEG data was obtained and 
analysed for the purpose of studying the effect of posthypnotic suggestion for visual 
hallucination on two highly suggestible individuals, TS-H and RM. For the sake of 
comparison, they went through the same task in the simulation condition encouraged to 
use goal-directed imagination. Data were also obtained from age- and gender-matched 
set of control subjects, who however performed only in the simulation task and 
additionally went through the normal comparative condition. In this chapter, the 
obtained results are reviewed, discussed in the context of previous empirical evidence 
on and theories of hypnosis and critically evaluated. 
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4.1. Summary and relation to the field of research 
 
First of all, the posthypnotic suggestion was seen to produce the suggested behaviour in 
both case subjects. Though they reported not remembering the suggestion given under 
hypnosis, both responded in agreement with it not only to the explicitly demanded 
stimuli of a particular colour, but also to stimuli combining the opposite colour and the 
suggestion-relevant shape. This implies that, at least on the rough behavioural level, the 
posthypnotic suggestion had the desired effect on performance. 
Closer analysis of the behavioural measurements confirmed the effect of the 
posthypnotic suggestion, but showed that TS-H was more efficient in responding to it, 
while RM had better results when using mere imagination. TS-H and RM did not 
outperform at their best, but at their worst did significantly differ from controls. For TS-
H this was seen in the simulation condition as high error rates and for RM in the 
posthypnotic condition as both high error rates and long response times. Therefore, 
hypnosis did not enhance performance of TS-H giving her extraordinary abilities, but 
using plain imagination in the simulation condition made her inefficient. RM seemed to 
benefit well from her imaginary abilities and was somewhat confused by the 
posthypnotic nature of the suggestion. These behavioural results indicate that the highly 
suggestible case subjects had clear dissimilarities in performance both between 
conditions and among themselves.  
Previously, undeniable dissimilarities in self-reports, task performance, 
physiological and neural activation have been found even among those, who get equally 
high scores on the suggestibility scales (Howard & Coe, 1980; Schuyler & Coe, 1981; 
Szechtman et al., 1998; Terhune et al., 2011b). The obvious differences in performance 
and self-reports of TS-H and RM is a good example of this. It confirms that highly 
suggestible individuals are not a uniform group. Therefore, grouping according to 
suggestibility rates only and studying subjects as masses might conceal this 
heterogeneity. First, this conclusion supports the need to search for other measures of 
hypnotic responsiveness (Weitzenhoffer, 1980), since the suggestibility score is not 
sensitive enough. Second, it adds to the view according to which conducting case 
studies is a useful method for revealing the unique individual qualities and patterns 
(Kallio & Revonsuo, 2005; McConkey et al., 1989; Raz et al., 2007; Weitzenhoffer, 
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2000). Third, it forces to question the validity of most opinionated results obtained from 
the studies that examined subjects as large homogeneous groups, since their outcomes 
might not be descriptive of the hypnotic phenomena. 
In order to clarify further the nature and origin of the observed behavioural 
patterns the ERP results were analysed. Significant differences in ERPs were found 
among later peaks and had a posterior scalp distribution. This went along the lines of 
previous knowledge about the effects of visual non-spatial selective attention on ERP 
waves (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008) and the supposed connection of hypnosis and 
attention (Dietrich, 2003; Spiegel & Spiegel, 2004). Stimuli seemed to affect electrical 
brain activity by all features – colour, shape and their combination. The latter two 
demonstrated the effect of suggestion, which required shape-based responding, and 
attending to the conjunction of features.  
The combined effect of colour and shape, meant to clarify the influence of the 
suggestion, was significant only in the data of both highly suggestible individuals. The 
shape-based discrimination was seen among stimuli of the untargeted colour with lower 
amplitudes to stimuli of the suggestion-relevant shape, as opposed to those of the 
suggestion-irrelevant shape. In the data of RM this was seen as higher negativity of N2 
peak amplitudes, while for TS-H it emerged a bit later, as lower positivity in P3 time 
range. More negative amplitudes in N2 of RM might stand for greater orienting of 
visual attention towards the task-relevant stimuli targeted by the suggestion as opposed 
to stimuli that were to be ignored (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008), regulation of strategic 
behaviour (Band et al., 2003; Donkers & van Boxtel, 2004; Nieuwenhuis et al., 2003) or 
non-motoric stage of inhibition (Smith et al., 2008). More positive amplitudes in P3 of 
TS-H to unattended stimuli as opposed to those targeted by the suggestion might depict 
for instance clearer motor inhibition to those stimuli (Smith et al., 2008). Since the 
effect of shape was seen already in N2 time frame of both subjects, the different timing 
of the effect of colour and shape interaction might also denote simply individual 
temporal differences in the neural processing of the conjunction of features, with RM 
being slightly faster than TS-H, rather than qualitatively different processes.  
The effect of colour in the ERP data was the only one to accord with the 
differences in the behavioural results among highly suggestible case subjects since it 
was different between the conditions. Generally, stimuli of the untargeted colour caused 
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greater negativity in N2 and lower positivity in P3 time frames. However, this kind of 
negative shift did not occur in TS-H during the simulation condition and in RM was of 
slightly lower amplitude in the posthypnotic condition, according with their less 
accurate performance during these conditions. This could be interpreted as a later 
change in the orienting towards the more demanding group of stimuli the response to 
which required combining the features and discriminating based on the shape of the 
stimulus (Folstein & Van Petten, 2008; Linden, 2005). The examination of whether 
these trends represent changes in the more general SN which indicates rather a cognitive 
process initiated after selection is finished, such as perceptual analysis in the short-term 
memory or feature integration (Smid et al., 1999), would require further analysis. 
Control subjects managed to reach similar level of performance as highly 
suggestible subjects when using only goal-directed imagination. This finding compels to 
question whether TS-H could have simulated during the posthypnotic condition or held 
back in the simulation condition (Zamansky et al, 1964). An overview of the results 
shows that her behavioural performance in the simulation condition did not resemble 
that of simple responding to colour, but ERP results did show a pattern similar to that 
obtained in the normal condition of the control subjects with a shift of negativity from 
stimuli of the targeted colour to those of the untargeted colour. Nevertheless, since 
ERPs show no significant difference in attention to shape or colour-shape conjunction 
between conditions, she did pay attention also to shape. This could mean that in the 
simulation condition TS-H was not able to maintain focus on the whole task and her 
attention slipped more to the colour which was targeted. Her performance was 
deteriorated by this attentional slide, and combining the features of stimuli of the 
untargeted colour was delayed, which resulted in the omission of the response or a late 
response and thus higher error rates. 
If TS-H did not fake her performance, it seems that in the used experimental 
conditions she was just an inefficient simulator. During the simulation condition her 
attentional means were not well distributed and she tended to orient mostly to the 
colour. This might illustrate a need for her to deploy more resources to inhibit the real-
life perceptual signals when using mere imagination, and designate that hypnosis alters 
her background neural activity in a way which makes this process easier, as it is seen 
from the posthypnotic performance. When she received the suggestion under hypnosis, 
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execution of it with focusing attention on the demanding group of stimuli was effortless 
even though it had to be done already posthypnotically and the whole performance was 
enhanced. Another explanation would be that this result was due to some sort of carry-
over effect caused by the rapid alternation of posthypnotic and simulation condition. 
The performance of RM did not seem to be qualitatively affected by the way 
suggestion was presented, but was relatively more efficient when she was allowed to 
use conscious imagination. Fast to respond to suggestion for simulation, RM was 
confused when experiencing the influence of the posthypnotic suggestion – although her 
orienting worked in the same direction, processing and implementation were delayed. 
This might imply that for her the required processing was of the same kind in different 
conditions, involved the use of cognition even after hypnosis and thus did not resemble 
the assumed true visual hallucination (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003). 
The dispute over the necessity of the induction procedure for the effects of 
suggestion to occur in their full extent has gathered firm arguments on both sides 
(Mazzoni et al. 2009; Raz et al., 2006 vs. Derbyshire et al., 2009; Kosslyn et al. 2000). 
In the present study, suggestion given after induction resulted in the most optimal 
performance for the hypnotic virtuoso TS-H. This shows the importance of induction in 
receiving and processing of suggestions at least for some highly suggestible individuals. 
This can be due to the qualitatively different nature of the post-induction wakefulness as 
opposed to the general relaxed but alert wakefulness (Cardeña et al., 2012; Fingelkurts, 
Al. et al., 2007; Fingelkurts, An. et al., 2007; Terhune et al., 2011a). In the former, 
suggestion seemed to have the space to be processed and affect in another, more 
profound way, with efficient recruiting of volitional top-down attention and effortful 
control. 
In the case of TS-H, there seems to be a huge gap between the non-hypnotic and 
hypnotic suggestibility. This interval is known as hypnotisability, and at the general 
level is thought to be negligible (Kirsch & Braffman, 2001). Present results imply that if 
the focus is set at the individual level, this rule might not apply and the difference 
between the non-hypnotic and hypnotic suggestibility can be quite dramatic. Thus, in 
some cases the hypnotic responding cannot be well explained by the non-hypnotic 
suggestibility. 
  
43 
 
The verbalisation of the suggestion has proven to be crucial for the neural 
processes (Barabasz et al., 1999; Jensen et al., 2001). In the posthypnotic condition of 
the present study, a deceptive suggestion was used to ensure the subjectively convincing 
quality of possible visual hallucinations (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003). However, 
remembering the critique which obliterated the study of Kosslyn et al. (2000), who used 
dissimilar suggestions in alternative conditions, here the only addition made to the 
suggestion given during the simulation task was that of words “Imagine that you have 
received a suggestion during hypnosis according to which --”. Therefore, this factor is 
not considered to be responsible for the observed dissimilarities between the conditions. 
One more issue to keep in mind is that there is no proof that the posthypnotic 
suggestion would have evoked an actual visual hallucination. There is no direct 
evidence, excluding self-report, that even TS-H would have seen stimuli of a particular 
shape in the opposite colour right away, since the ERP waves of the stimuli targeted by 
the suggestion did not resemble those of the opposite colour. Nevertheless, later ERP 
peaks of these stimuli did differ significantly from those of the same colour, but 
suggestion-irrelevant shape. That is, the perception of shape did modify the processing 
of stimuli of the same colour in the later phase and could have had the effect on the 
level of conscious experience such as increasing the orienting of attention (Linden, 
2005). If this interpretation holds, current results could add to the previous findings of 
the power of suggestion to interfere with automatic perceptual processing (Kosslyn et 
al., 2000; Mazzoni et al., 2009; McGeown et al., 2012; Raz et al., 2005; Raz et al., 2006; 
Raz et al., 2007; Raz et al., 2002), in this case the colour perception. 
 
4.2. Limitations, strengths and future perspectives 
 
The results of the present study were not all straightforward − some of them raised 
propositions for enhancement and some evoked more questions than they answered. 
First is the concern about the validity of the statistical analysis of behavioural and ERP 
data following the previous examples (Kallio & Koivisto, in press; Kallio et al., 1999). 
Treating individual’s blocks as cases has the disadvantage of violating the assumption 
of independence of observations in ANOVA and suggests the results be viewed with 
caution. The used approach was considered to be sufficient for the requirements of the 
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present study given the similarity with the previous works (Kallio & Koivisto, in press; 
Kallio et al., 1999). However, in the future it could be worth further analysis for 
example using the generalized estimating equations which allow relaxation of some of 
the assumptions of traditional methods (Liang & Zeger, 1986).  
Second, the fact that the colour-shape conjunction showed merely dissimilar 
trends in ERP deflections in the two alternative conditions of highly suggestible 
subjects sets a question of whether these stimuli went through any different processing, 
which could be expected if true colour hallucinations are expected to occur and 
considered to be automatic as opposed to conscious mental imagery (Kallio & 
Revonsuo, 2003). Nonetheless, it is possible that the spatially limited nature of EEG 
recording and confining analysis to six posterior electrode sites could have concealed 
some influential neural processes especially those originating from the frontal parts. 
Consequently, this matter will require further investigation. 
Though methodological details of the present experiment were carefully chosen, 
some of them restricted taking a position as regards to possible neural correlates of 
hypnosis found recently. The main of such specialties was focusing on the posthypnotic 
instead of hypnotic performance. This allowed to take interpretations of the results to 
the level of experience, not only behaviour (McConkey, 2008), but hindered making 
any inferences about hypnosis as a state. In addition to that, the default mode network 
(McGeown et al., 2009; McGeown et al., 2012; Rainville et al., 1999; Raz et al., 2005) 
was outside the coverage area of EEG measurement and the changes in the prefrontal 
activity (Dietrich, 2003) were not examined. To benefit from the methodological 
choices of the present study, further analysis of the data could be done for example on 
the alterations in functional connectivity (Cardeña et al., 2012; Fingelkurts, An. et al., 
2007; Terhune et al., 2011a) and brain oscillations (Fingelkurts, Al. et al., 2007) during 
the performance in different conditions.  
RM and TS-H are not equally experienced hypnotic responders. Thus, one more 
question evoked by the results was whether the observed dissimilarities between the two 
case subjects could be explained by the relative inexperience of RM as a hypnotic 
responder, or could they actually be due to some profound individual features and 
innate differences of neural processing. This issue remains to be studied in the future 
also on other highly suggestible hypnotic responders.  
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Although induction played an important role in the performance of case subjects 
TS-H and RM, the control subjects were able to mimic the effect of posthypnotic 
suggestion quite successfully. Supposing that true hallucinations can be brought only by 
deceptive suggestions following an induction (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003), these results 
might mean that the used measurements were not sensitive enough to distinguish true 
realistic visual hallucinations from the mere use of one’s imagination. Another 
explanation would be that the powerful effect of suggestion was not restricted to highly 
suggestible subjects, which would devour the whole idea of hypnotic virtuosos. Also 
this topic will require more precise examination in the future. 
The research on posthypnotic suggestions for visual hallucinations is yet quite 
scarce. Therefore, each step, such as the present study, is valuable. The main strengths 
of it were the combination of both behavioural and EEG measurements, inclusion of 
several highly suggestible individuals and the gathered control evidence from the naïve 
matched subjects. In addition to the theoretical bearing, any research that scrapes the 
topic of visual hallucinations has the potential to become not only phenomenologically, 
but also clinically significant, as hallucinations often occur in neurodegenerative 
disorders, brain injuries and psychosis. The overall ability to respond to imaginative 
suggestions is a normal human capacity and important as a possible tool in such areas as 
pain management (Kirsch and Braffman, 2001). Understanding the physiological and 
cognitive effects of hypnosis might also be significant for its therapeutic 
implementation. All these possible benefits make solving the mystery of hypnosis more 
and more attractive, and the new research is hoped to build up a solid ground in the field 
of hypnosis and a firm base for its use. 
 
4.3. Conclusions 
 
Whether the posthypnotic suggestion can change the actual visual experiences, such as 
the perception of colour in a stimulus of a specific form, cannot be firmly concluded 
based on these data. Induction seemed to help the hypnotic virtuoso follow the given 
suggestion, and she was not able to simulate her posthypnotic performance. However, it 
did not have a clear influence on the performance of another highly suggestible subject 
and the control subjects were able to perform equally well with mere imagination. 
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Therefore, the main well-founded conclusions brought about by the present results are 
that there are obvious dissimilarities in attentional directing between the posthypnotic 
and simulation conditions and also variance even among the highly suggestible subjects 
which must be taken into account. 
The obtained evidence supports the possibility that something extraordinary 
happens to the hypnotic virtuoso TS-H when she is introduced with hypnosis. Present 
results in combination with the previous knowledge of the changes that take place in her 
volitional eye-movements (Kallio et al., 2011) and neural functional synchronicity 
(Fingelkurts, An. et al., 2007), accompanied by the remained frontal activity 
(Fingelkurts, Al. et al., 2007; Kallio et al., 1999), fortify the idea of a profound shift in 
her mental processes during hypnosis. Redirecting attentional resources or toning down 
the external noise together with changes in the recorded neural activity are compatible 
with the idea of functional changes in different frontal circuits as a source of the altered 
states of consciousness (Dietrich, 2003) and fortify the connection between hypnosis 
and the proposed altered brain states. 
There is no reason to doubt the reality of hypnotic phenomena as the research 
shows they resemble those produced by real-life experiences (Kosslyn et al., 2000; 
Szechtman et al., 1998). On the other hand, there is no need to classify them as 
incomprehensible and being beyond the reach of a common man since many of them 
can occur also without the involvement of hypnosis (Kirsch, 2001). Within these loose 
boundaries of universal endorsement the contemporary controversy over the definition 
and interpretation of hypnosis is continued in a restless state vs. non-state debate. 
Though hypnosis is an ancient discovery, defining, parsing and investigating the 
fascinating phenomena of altered consciousness began relatively recently. Nonetheless, 
many in the field of hypnosis research have already hurried to choose their stance, as 
indicated by the clear distinction of sides in the state vs. non-state debate (Kallio & 
Revonsuo, 2003; Lynn & Green, 2011; Lynn et al., 2008). Tender reassurances that 
defining hypnosis as a state does not explain it as a phenomenon but only aids the 
categorizing (Kallio & Revonsuo, 2003), do not help bring the opponents together. In 
the promised age of neuroscience opinion is qualified only when it is made of 
bulletproof empirical evidence. In that sense, the present results offer a fruitful ground 
for the revision of current theories and background information. 
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